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Pearson and Langham: Farm Movement in America's Heartland
THE FARM MOVEMENT IN AMERICA'S HEARTLAND:

A PROFILE OF LEADERS, THEIR POWER, AND PROBLEMS

Suzan F. Pearson and Thomas C. Langham

. .

Department of Social Sciences
McNeese State University
Introduction

A body ofnew farm leaders emerged during themid-1980s in response to the"
farm crisis in the Upper Midwest. This paper explores the influence of these
leaders inshaping thedirection oftheir groups. It does sothrough examining
the farm leaders' socio-demographic characteristics, their use of power, and
the way they confront problems. The leaders oftwo groups, the Farm Crisis
Committee (FCC) and Groundswell (GS), are studied. The data for this
paper were collected through useofa nonrandom-purposive sampling method.

They were gathered through administration ofa survey questionnaire in 1986
and intensive interviews during 1986-87. All eight of the FCC's andseven of
nine of GS's founding leaders participated. These persons were identifled as

leaders because they held elected orappointed positions in their groups. The
surveys and interviews for the leaders of the FCC were carried out at the

group's office in Emerson, Nebraska, while those of GS, because the
organization in its early days had no headquarters, were conducted at their

individual homes or in restaurants throughout Minnesota. This paper's
findings are further supported through use ofdocumentary data from the farm
groups and' supplementary secondary data, including scholarly publications,
magazines, newspapers, and a television documentary.

The FCC and GS, as groups giving rise to a social movement, might be
studied in many ways, but this paper focuses on exploring the leaders'
influence in shaping the groups. Much of the scholarly literature on social
movements explores how and why they originate. Social movements have

been explained through structural (Brinton, 1965; Sraelser, 1973), socialpsychological (Da\ies, 1962; Gurr, 1968, 1970), and organizational theories
(Gamson, 1975; Obershcall, 1973; Tilly, 1975). Comparatively little theoretical
attention has been given to discussing who leaders are and what they do.
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'Among those who have discussed leadership styles are Rex D. Hooper (1950),
Rudolph Heberle (1951), Kurt and Gladys Lang (1961), and Lewis M. KilHan
(1964: 440-43). Killian provides the most useful model. He suggests that
there are three basic kinds of leaders: charismatic, administrative, and
intellectual. The charismatic leader uses personal attractiveness to rally
followers. The administrative leader takes care of everyday organizational

problems. And, the intellectual leader creates ideology. Killian adds that the
charismatic leader often gives rise to the movement, while the administrative
leader acts to consolidate it. In discussing how the farm leaders shaped their

movement, this paper points out the leaders' different leadership styles, and
notes how these styles influenced their movement.

The farm crisis ofthemid-1980s had deep historical roots in theMidwest.

Almost from the beginning of the region's settlement in the mid-ninetcenlh
century, farmers experienced problems wth weather and financing. Farmers
historically believed they could succeed, but the problems they confronted
repeatedly overwhelmed them. Continuing crises caused serious weaknesses
within the principal institutions of farm communities. Farmers were left
vulnerable to little understood outside forces, and this resulted in the sustained
removal from the land with often catastrophic consequences for their families

(Fite, 1981; Hamilton, 1986; Lewontin and Berlan, 1986; Nugent, 1986;
Rasmussen, 1986; Taylor, 1953; Waterfield, 1986: 1-18; Wimberly, 1986).
Agrarian protest movements in the Midwest have always lacked economic,

political, and social coherence because farmers have remained isolated from
the rapidly modernizingworld and clung tenaciously to their traditional norms,
values, and beliefs (Hoover, 1983; Kerbo, 1983: 268-72; Kolko, 1984. 23-26,
McNaU, 1988; Roberts and Kloss, 1979). Yet despite the objective conditions
that farmers have faced, and probably because they failed to understand them

fully, farmers have continued their attempts to organize to defend what they
have perceived to be their own interests (Savola, 1985).
The historical crisis of the farmer in the Upper Midwest continued up

through the mid-1980s. The Farm Credit system reported a loss on farm
loans of$2.69 billion for 1985, itsfirst loss since the Great Depression ofthe
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1930s and the largest' debt ever posted by'ari American banking institution
(Dorr, 1986). The United StatesDepartment of Agriculture (1985) estimated
in March 1985 that 386,000 (18.0%) of the nations's 2.1 million farms were in
financial distress, and that 93,000 (4.5%) of these farms were technically
insolvent. Roughly 5.0% of America's farmers left the land in 1985 (Eason,
1986). The Midwest Association of State Departments of Agriculture
estimated that about 5.0% of all farms in nine Midwestern states would fail

in 1986 (Cordes, 1986). Stuart Hardy, an agricultural expert of the United
States Chamber of Commerce, predicted that in 1986there would be "another

big bloodletting" (Eason, 1986). In addition, Robert Thompson, theAssistant
Secretary of Agriculture, commented that the Reagan Administration would
like a 10.0% shrinkage in the land farmed between 1986-89. He further

concluded that there were "too many farmers" (Eason, 1986). American
farmers seemed to be inserious financial trouble and could expect little help
from their government.

The severity of the conditions that the farmers

confronted gave rise to new farm protest. '
The Rise of the New Groups and Their Leaders

Numerous new farm groups emerged after mid-1984 in response to the
farm crisis. These groups were the offspring of the American Agricultural
Movement of the late 1970s, which had emulated the strategies of previous
generations of farm activists and the more recent civil rights and antiwar
protesters, in an attempt to-extract agricultural reform from the federal and

state governments (Browne, 1988: 66-72). The new farm groups struggled to

protest conditions, lobby politicians, prowde emotional health care, supply
emergency food, furnish information through telephone networks, andanswer

religious needs. These groups, generally speaking, suffered from lack ofdayto-day organizational skills, understanding of the problems they confronted,
and vision about the kind of change that was necessary to resolve their
problems. These organizations were overwhelmingly committed to nonviolent
reform, although some right-wing fringe groups existed thatadvocated violent
resistance and even overthrow of the national government (Harrison, 1985;
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Scholer, 1985). Among the most interesting developments of the new farm

groups was the emergence of women into leadership roles. This change took
place in conjunction with the more active role that women were playing
throughout American society. These farm groups together momentarily
became in the mid-1980s

a powerful voice in the Midwest that called

attention to the farm crisis not only in their region but throughout the nation.
Among the newly emerging groups were the FCC and GS.

The FCC first appeared on the scene in November 1984. A group of
farmers, who visited regularly at Tim Wrage's Emerson Fertilizer Company,

a daily gathering spot for farmers from the area around Emerson, Nebraska,
started the organization and elected Wrage as its leader. They believed
Wrage was the most qualified to head up the group because he was a
community business leader, had a college bachelor's degree, and solved
problems quickly. The founders, in short, liked and respected Wrage
(Fuchser, 1986; Wrage, 1986). Wragequickly took controlof the organization
^ving it coherence and direction as an activist farm group.
GS also began in November 1984, but in a somewhat different fashion.
Bobbi Folzine and the head of Job Service in Worthmgton, Minnesota, wrote

a grant proposal to obtain legal aid and psychological counseling for farmers
in financial trouble. The grant in its final form was approved for the purpose
of helpingfarmers to get out of farming. Polzine wanted nothing to do with
a program that encouraged framers to quit. She and several friends

subsequently got togetherand planned a farm rally that washeld at Memorial
Stadium in Worthington during November. About five hundred persons
attended the rally. Polzinecommented to a news reporter that this represent

ed a "groundswell." The name of the group accordingly emerged from the

rally, andalong with it Polzine as GS'sforemost leader(Larson, 1986; Polzine,
1986).

Under the leadership of Wrage and Polzine, the founders of the FCC and
GS worked to form their respective organizations. Both groups elected
leaders, and established official polity. The FCC's leaders initially set their

group's goals to obtain higher prices for commodities, lower interestrates on
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operating capital, government imposition of a 5.0% limit on foreign matter in
grain, short-term guaranteed farm operating loans, and a sense of unity and
support among farmers and their organizations (Farm Crisis Committee,.
1984). GS, likewise, elected its first leaders in November 1984. These leaders
formed OS's initial steering committee. They formulated OS's first policy
positions calling for a moratorium on farm, home, business, and bank

foreclosures, a fair price for agricultural products, lower interest rates, farm
debt reduction, and a short-term program of guaranteed farm operating loans
(Groundswell, 1984). Both groups' goals were thus much the same.

The FCC and GS's strategies for achieving their goals also had common
elements, for both wshed to approach legislative bodies for reformist

remedies. The FCC primarily looked to the federal congress for answers,
while GS focused its efforts on gaining legislative assistance at the state level.
Both groups carried on campaigns to make their positions known to

politicians,the media, and the people in their areas! What differentiated these
groups from the standpoint of strategy was that the FCC came to rely almost
solely upon lobbying, while GS advocated not only the use of lobbying but

nonviolent, passive resistance. This difference in strategic approaches gave
these groups quite different public images, even though from the beginning

their goals we're quite similar.
' The FCC held a rally at the Sioux City Municipal Auditorium in January

1985 attracting about four thousand persons (Antonen, 1985). The FCC also
sponsored a benefit concert at the Sioux City MunicipalAuditorium in August
1985. The concert, which featured country-western singer Merle Haggard

drew an attendance of about 4,500 (Fuchser, 1986). Haggard donated $10,000
to the FCC despite the attendance being insufficient to cover the concert's
costs. The FCC leaders, after this activity, stopped organizing mass rallies

because they believed them to be an ineffective wayto bring about relief from
their problems. Thereafter, the FCC leaders focused their efforts on lobbying
the federal government (Wrage, 1986).
The GS leaders' first major action came when they called upon farmers
to march to the Minnesota capitol to protest farm conditions. This rally took
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place during January 1985. It drew between ten and twelve thousand farmers
("Farmer Solidarity," 1985). Twelve people were arrested for disorderly
conduct and criminaltrespass (Malcolm, 1985). A small band of GS activists
next took over the Production Credit Association office in Worthington during

April to protest the planned foreclosure on the Polzine farm. Several people
were also arrested at this gathering (Grant, 1985; Willette, 1985). The leaders
of GS led a second march on the state capitol during January 1986, but only

about 2,500 persons participated (Swoboda, 1986). GS activists additionally
blocked foreclosure auctions throughout 1985 and early 1986 in an effort to

keep Minnesota farmers on the land and to draw attention to their plight.
They also pursued a more quiet approach of lobbying state legislators for
help.

Despitethe FCC and GS activists' efforts to bring government assistance
through high-visibility actionsand less attention-gettinglobbying, these groups
never really gained a sizable popular following, though they did at times
attract large crowds with their mass rallies. The peak number of active

supporters for each of the groups wasprobably nevermore than five hundred
persons. Popular support from the farm community, as displayed by
attendance at mass rallies, plainly dwindled for both groups by early in 1986.
Farmers still faced economic hardship and foreclosures, and the new farm
groups had made no real progress through protest or lobbying in bringingthe
crisis to an end (Young, 1986).

Characteristics of the Leaders

A glimpse into the backgrounds of the farm leaders helps to explain how
they affected their groups and struggled to resolve the crisis. This section
therefore looks at different sodo-demographic characteristics of the leaders,

including sex, age, education, occupation, income, social assistance use,

reli^on, participation in organizations, and political identification.

The

information used to construct this profile was taken from both the question

nairesand interviews. The questionnaires supplied details concerning specific
characteristics, and the interviews furnished additional insights and aided in
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interpretation. When questionnaire data isused inthis section, theleaders are
not identified by name. This arrangement was agreed upon with the leaders
so as to keep their personal characteristics confidential. The leaders are,
however, identified, with their consent, by groups sothat theleadership ofthe
FCC and GS might be compared. Comments taken from the interviewsof the

leaders have, also with their permission, been used to help substantiate some
of the interpretations of data.

Men have traditionally dominated farm leadership in the Midwest (Buck,
1920; Cramplon, 1965; Flora and Johnson, 1978; Kile, 1948; Rogers and

Burdge, 1972). But with the farm crisis of the mid-1980s, an interesting
change took place. Women began to play an unprecedented role in farm

groups. The farm women's activism corresponded with the emerging greater
participation ofwomen throughout American society. Remarkably six ofthe
fifteen FCC and GS leaders were women. Four ofGS's leaders were women,
and two were in the FCC. Men in both groups reacted positively to the
women's participation in leadership roles. All the leaders believed that

women should not only add their insights but actively participate in farm
group activities;

The farm leaders, both men and women, tended to be in their early to
mid-forties. The range of their ages was from 30 to 62 years, with the men

30 to 62 and the women 31 to 51. There was no significant difference inages
between the leaders of the FCC and GS. Their ages revealed that those
leaders confronting' the crisis were chronologically mature persons. Their
participation as activists was therefore somewhat surprising because most
people at their ages in Upper Midwest communities were well-settled into

their life styles. This finding perhaps suggested that their newly found activism
may have been a measure of their desperation.
The farm leaders received only limited amounts of formal education.
Both themen and women generally completed high school. The FCC leaders

were slightly better educated than those of GS in that they were more likely
to have attended some college. Out of all the leaders, there was only one
college graduate. Sociologists Judith Heffernan (1985) and Thomas C.
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Lahgham (1988) conducted studies examining financially distressed farmers in
the Midwest, and they found similar educational levels in their samples. Also
the United States Bureau of the Census (1985: 133) reported that people in
the United States who were twenty-five years and older had a median

education of12.6 years. The farm leaders had about a typical education for
Americans.

The formal education that farmers achieved was notnecessarily sufficient

to help them avoid the problems that the farm community confronted. First,
their limited education made obtaining employment beyond the farm very
difficult. Jobs were hard to locate in theMidwest during the mid-1980s, and
even more so without a technical skUl or college degree (Bluestone and

Hession, 1986: 127-28). This lack ofeducation may have in part led them to
become activists. Secondly, the farm leaders believed that their lack of formal
education kept them from fully understanding the causes of what was

happening to them, and that this prevented them from developing effective
strate^es to deal with their situation. Fuchser (1986) commented that she
thought the FCC was.unable to set up programs to help farmers because their
group did not haw enough education. The lack of education among the
leaders may have had a critical impact, as it did with many farm families, on
their ability to make a living, but probably little affected their response to the
crisis. Additional formal education, for instance, at a Midwestern land-grant

university, would not have done much to prepare them to lead a social
movement nor to develop the understanding necessary to move beyond
present structural arrangements.

Income was another important factor in explaining the activism ofthose

who led the farm groups. Table 1shows the net incomes of the farm leaders
for 1984. Only two of the fifteen leaders had nonfarm incomes. They have
been excluded from thetable, because their incomes were atypical ofthefarm
leaders. The netincome of thefarm leaders' families in 1984 ranged from -

$111,000 to $12,600, with the FCC from -$25,000 to $12,600 and GS -$111,000
to $10,800. Table 1 reveals that the farm crisis probably had a more severe

financial impact on the GS leaders than ithad on the FCC leaders. These net
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income losses and low.incomes of the FCC and GS leaders for 1984 were no

doubt an important factor that led them to activism.
Table 1

Farm Leader Family Net Income in 1984
FCC

GS

-$25,000
-$10,000
-$6,500
0
0•
$11,000
$12,600

-$111,000
-$44,000
-$30,000
-$10,000
$6,574
$10,800

The United States Bureau of the Census (1985: 645), based on a random
sample of 1,558farm families completed in 1983, reported that 23.2%, of the
•

families
had incomes under $10,000,16.3% between
$10,000 to $14,999,13.5%
•
'v
between $15,000 to $19,999,12.0% between $20,0(W to $24,999, and 35.0% at

$25,000 or greater. When compared to the farm family income categories
above, the farm leaders' incomes were toward the bottom of the income levels

that might have been expected. This data thus provides further insight into
/

why the farm leaders chose to protest.
, The low incomes of the leaders might suggest that they would have
received federal or state social assistance. Yet, at the time of this survey, most
farmers could not qualify for social sersices because their assets were counted

as income. Only four of the thirteen leaders received any kind of assistance
from the federal or state governments, with one from the FCC and three from

GS. The help given was in the form of food stamps and fuel assistance. This
was an extremely small number in light of the fact that seven of the thirteen

leaders in 1984 had net income losses. Federal regulations were in part

changed following the administration of this study's questionnaire.

The

modifications reportedly enabled more farmers to become eligible for food
stamps {Farm Crisis CommitteeNewsletter^ April 18,1986). This still may not
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have changed the leaders' utilization levels for social assistance, because area

farmers placed great importance on remaining independent and self-sufficient.
There was therefore a sad irony in this situation in that those farm leaders
who produced crops and livestock could not afford to feed and cloth
themselves and their families as they had been accustomed to doing in the
past.

The data on religious participation among the farm leaders revealed a
curious pattern. Despite the wide array of Christian churches in the area, the
farm leaders belonged to either the Catholic or Lutheran denominations.
Nine of the fifteen leaders were Catholic, with five from the FCC and four

from GS. Six of the fifteen leaders were Lutheran, wth three from the FCC

and three from GS. Why all the farm leaders came from just two religious
groups is unclear. Possibly the members of these religious denominations,

which have a reputation in the region for being highly cohesive, experienced,
as a consequence of the farm crisis, comparativelyserious social disorganiza
tion in their lives. Or, perhaps the cohesive nature of the Catholic and
Lutheran groups provided a setting, which other religious denominations did
not, that encouraged farm activists to organize.
The farm leaders were unusually active people in their communities.

Eleven of the fifteen leaders participated in activities (such as farm, labor,
political, and social organizations) beyond their own farm group. Nine of the
fifteen leaders, four from the FCC and five from GS, had held leadership
positions prior to the establishment of their groups. As for farm organiza

tions, they had belonged to the National Farmers Organization, the National
Farmers Union, or the American Farm Bureau Federation. None stated that

they had been previously associated with the American Agricultural Move
ment. Their participation in farm and other organizations as well as their
previous leadership experience demonstrated that the majority of the leaders

had long histories of community actirism. Their histories of past community

leadership are important in explaining their more recent activism. The farm
leaders did not just appear on the scene, but rather they were people who had
always taken an interest in their communities. Equally important, the farm

10
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leaders were members of well-established community groups, and none had
Imkages to extremist organizations. This perhaps goes a long way toward
explaining their reformist analyses of the crisis of the mid-1980s.

The farm leaders were for the most part registered with themajor Ameri
can political parties. Ten of the fifteen leaders were re^stered \wth the
Democratic Party, with four from the FCC and six from GS. Three of the

fifteen leaders were registered with the Republican Party, all three from the
FCC. And, two of the fifteen leaders, one from the FCC and one from GS,
were not registered wth any political party. Even though the farm leaders

had been driven to create new organizations to deal with the farm crisis, they
surprisingly showed little alienation from the mainstream parties. They were
certainly not as alienated as the typical financially distressed farmer seemed

tobe. Langham (1988) observed a high degree ofpolitical alienation from the
major political parties among farmers experiencing financial difficulties in the
same geographical area. This may have been because the leaders were the sort

of people that believed and participated in the established politick system.
The farm leaders comprised a distinctive group ofindividuals in the agricultur
al community whose personal characteristics in large part gave rise to their
activism. The pressures of insufficient income and education, and the
apparent .disruption oftheir church community, made the leaders personally
and painfully aware of the crisis. Their histories of community involvement
also provided a reason for their taking leadership ofthe newly emerging farm
groups. These factors, combined with important changes in American society,

involving women, helped to make sense ofthe unprecedented participation of
women in leadership roles. Yet, the political activism ofthe new leaders, both

men and women, led them down a very traditional path, for they were long
time participants in their local communities' political establishments. Their

penchant for traditional political solutions, a reflection oftheir deeply rooted
ties to the structure of their society, perhaps explains their failure to
comprehend the historical-structural dimensions of the crisis. Italso probably

provides a reason for their inability to look for new solutions beyond the
structure that systematically robbed them of their livelihood and community.
11
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Power in the Farm Groups

Power within an organization is determined by the ability ofindi^iduals
to get what they want through the decision-making process. And, charismatic
authority, as pointed out earlier in this paper, can dictate the use ofpower.
Wrage and Polzine's charismatic use ofpower early on shaped the FCC and
GS. The structure of the FCC and OS are outlined in this section to reveal

how Wrage and Polzine, as charismatic leaders, played, along with a few other
leaders who possessed considerably less power, a major role ininfluencing the
direction oftheir groups. The roots of power in these groups can best be
observed through examining who made the daily decisions, constructed general
poli^, produced the newsletter, obtained media visibility, and delivered public

speeches. By examining who controlled these several important aspects of the
groups, what becomes clear is that avery small number ofpersons shaped the
FCC and GS.

A handful ofleaders, but especially Wrage and Polzine, held most ofthe

FCC and GS*s power in terms of making daily decisions as well as general
policy. Four national leaders and the three state coordinators constituted the
FCC's board of directors. Together they made decisions on everyday matters

and larger policy concerns. The inclusion of the state coordinators was

supposed to assure that the concerns of all the members would be considered,
but in practice the larger membership was little consulted on most issues.
Wrage stated that he tried to delegate power to various committees, but they
proved unable to make dedsions (Wrage, 1986). Daily decisions as well as
general policies were in fact thus generated at the Emerson headquarters of
the FCC by Wrage and those board members who passed in-and-out during
the day. The more formal governing structure of the organization did little
more than ratify those decisions. Wrage was atthe core of the daily decision
and policy-making process at all levels.

GS's steering committee, made up of the handful of leaders surrounding
Polzine and Larson, recommended policy to its sixty-member board of
directors. The board of directors only ratified policy and could not veto any
12
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steering committee decision concerning policy. The group's real power
therefore resided in thesteering committee, and especially in the hands ofi^
co-chairs, Polzine and, to a much lesser extent, Larson. As mentioned earlier,
the steering committee members also chaired the committees that made up
GS. Accordingly a small number of personsin OS, just as in the FCC, ran the

group, andbothorganizations were dependent onthe\isions oftheir founding
leaders, Wrage and Polzine.

Control of the groups' newsletters was an important source ofpower, for
theinformation they provided shaped theideas ofthefollowers. Wrage, Betty
Fuchser, and Pat Huggenberger primarily were responsible for writing the
Fann Crisis Committee Newsletter, and Delores Swoboda was the sole author

of the Groundswell Newsletter. Both newsletters were published irregularly,
but they generally were circulated about once per month. The newsletters

well-reflected the farm leaders perceptions ofthe farm crisis as vyell as their
ideas for resolving it. They provided simplistic explanations offering
conventional solutions,.largely borrowed from local news media sources and

other farm groups. The Farm Crisis Committee Newsletter was quite folksy,
at times offering recipes, remedies for home problems, and even comic
clippings from newspapers.

The Groundswell Newsletter stuck more to

reporting events related to the farm crisis, but it too, like the Fann Crisis

Committee Newsletter, fell far short of being useful because of its provincial
explanations and failure to comprehend the structural roots of the crisis. So

while only. a.few members of the FCC and one, person in OS. controlled the .

newsletter, none ofthese people fully utilized the power that their news organs
might have offered to rally and educate supporters.
The leaders ofthe FCC and GS also amassed power through media and

speaking appearances. Public appearances were the most important source
ofpower that the leaders held, because those who gained the most visibility
had the greatest influence over their groups (DeLind, 1985-86). Wrage was
the main spokesperson for the FCC, and had the greatest visibility ofthe FCC
leaders. From the earliest days ofthe FCC, he delivered a weekly editorialinformational piece on a local Sioux City, Iowa, radio station, KMNS, entitled
13

Published by Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and13
Informa

Great Plains Sociologist, Vol. 3 [1990], Art. 2

'Tim's Radio Speech." KMNS dropped this radio program in March 1986.

The station underwent a programming change and all agricultural broadcast
ing, except the market report, was ended (Farm Crisis Committee Newsletter^
March 14,1986; Fuchser, 1986). The loss of the radio program coincided with

the farm activist groups decline in popular support.

Beyond the radio

program, Wrage also spoke throughout the Midwest region at public

gatherings and periodically traveled to Washington, D.C., to lobby on behalf
of farmers. Wrage's public appearances thus served as an important basis for
his power within the FCC.

Polzine and Larson were the main spokespersons for their group. Both
appeared in a 1985 Home Box Office documentary, "Down and Out in

America," that in part focused on the farm crisis (Grant, 1985). The media
directed most of its attention to Polzine, and she was regularly quoted on
television^ in newspapers, and on radio. Polzine's public appearances attracted
a great deal of media attention, and resulted in added financial support for
GS. Pol^e appeared on national televisionat Willie Nelson's first Farm Aid
Concert in Champaign, Illinois, in September 1985. GS, as a result, received
$20,000 from the Farm Aid Concert Committee. Polane was also invited to

visit Nicaragua, and took two trips there, one during summer 1985 and the

other in sprmg 1986. While in Nicaragua she studied farmmg methods and
met with the leaders of the Daniel Ortega government. Still later, Polzine was
asked to travel to the Philippines to view the workings of the government of
Corazon Aquino (Larson, 1986; Polzine, 1987). As the foremost spokesperson
of her group, Polzine, like Wrage, was thus able to gain power through media
and speaking appearances, and this gave her great influence among her fellow
leaders and supporters.
Wrage and Polzine controlled the core of power in their groups. This
power was rooted in their charismatic leadership that made possible the

founding of their groups. They reinforced their charismatic power through
shaping daily decisions and general policy, and through maintaining high
public visibility. Their active roles gave them the authority to lead. Ultimately

this point was perhaps best illustrated when many of the leaders who were

14
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interviewed for this study suggested that Wrage or Polane be asked for
clarification of information. The other leaders seemed to have less confidence

in themselves to make policy statements or decisions, and chose to defer to
the most visible leaders of their groups. In the final analysis, Wrage and
Polzine, from the earliest days of the FCC and GS; held the power to lead,
and this power was grounded in charismatic authority.

Farm Movement Problems

The leaders of the FCC and OS confronted several problems in

attempting to bring about changes that would improve the situation of farmers
in the Upper Midwest. From the standpoint of leadership, the charismatic'
authority of Wrage and Polzine would prove inadequate to push their groups

forward. Their leadership would give way. Wrage presided over the collapse
of the FCC, and Polzine was removed from the leadership of OS. Administra
tive leaders replaced Polzine. No intellectual leaders would emerge in either
group, and this would prevent the groups from finding new ideological

direction. Almost from the outset of the founding of these groups, theyconfronted; in addition to a crisis of leadership, two additional kinds of
problems that impeded their ability to deal with the farm crisis. These

problems were ones of organization and understanding. The organizational
problems involved isolation, fragmentation, and personalism. The problems
of understanding revolved around the leaders' failure to comprehend the full

extent of' the crisis and their confusion regarding objectives and strategies.
While the organizational problems manifestedthemselves in a greater number

of ways and threatened the continued existence' of the groups, the problems
of understanding proved to be even more difficult to resolve because they
I

required the time necessary to learn to think in new ways. The leaders of the
FCC and OS faced these problems from almost the be^nning of their

organizations, and they limited their effectiveness in achieving the groups'
goals.

Perhaps the most vexing organizational problem that the farm leaders

confronted was the bolation of theirgroups from one another. This problem
15
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came about as a result of the structure of American agriculture, which

produced a society typified by great distances between farms and towns.
These distances encouraged the development of regional leadership and

groups. Both the FCC and GS carved out their own spheres of influence.
The FCC, although it claimed to be a national organization, having satellite

groups in Nebraska, Iowa, and South Dakota and working to establish others
elsewhere, was geographically confined to Western Iowa and Northeastern
Nebraska. Likewise, GS operated withinnarrowlydefined geographical areas
of Minnesota, and had even less aspirations to extend itself. This meant that

these groups, and others like them throughout the Midwest, operated
autonomously and vs^th little specific knowledge of what other groups were

doing. The FCC and GS did sometimes exchange newsletters, but beyond
that they maintained little contact.

The National Save the Family Farm Coalition (NSFFC), which the FCC
and GS joined, appeared in 1986. It was one of several larger organizations

that was formed during the mid-1980s to foster contact between the many
emerging farm groups throughout the nation. The NSFFC was for the FCC
and GS perhaps the most influential of the overarchingorganizations that they
joined, but theyalso belongedto others, such as the North American Farmers'
Alliance, the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the Center for Rural

Affairs, and Prairiefire. About thirty farm groups associated themselves wth
the NSFFC. Its ability to pull the groups together remained limited, and the
farm groups continuedto be isolated (Browne, 1988:78-79). The consequen
ces of the FCC, GS, and other groups' isolationwas that they proved unable
to define their problems in a common wayand failed to act in concert to seek
solutions.

Another serious organizational problem that the farm leaders faced was
fragmentation within their groups. Internal conflict involving personalities,

tactics, and policy adversely affected both the FCC and GS. Much of this
conflict originated in the charismatic-style leadership of the groups' leaders.
Many of the FCC's Iowa supporters left the group in May 1985 to form the
Western Iowa Farm Crisis Committee (later renamed the Iowa Farm Crisis
16

https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol3/iss1/2

16

Pearson and Langham: Farm Movement in America's Heartland

Network). This split developed due to personality conflicts and disagreements
concerning strategies for getting help from the government (Fuchser and
Schmedding, 1986; Whiteing, 1986). GS also experienced a similar sort of
fragmentation. A number of OS's leaders objected to Polzine's personalistic
control and found the general disorganization of their group to be discourag
ing. The consequence of this disenchantment within GS was fragmentation.
OS's problems reached the crisis point during spring 1986. The group's

leaders became angered with Polzine after she returned from her second trip
to Nicaragua. They complained they were notbeing informed ofheractivities,

and that those activities were in conflict with the group's goals. OS's steering
committee removed her in July from the post of co-chair, and the group's
other co-chair, Larson, subsequently resigned. GS continued imder the

collective leadership of the steering committee (Larson, 1987; Polzine, 1987;
Swoboda, 1987). Administrative leadership prevailed with the removal of the
group's charismatic leader.

Fragmentation plainly has been a longstanding problem for farm groups.
The situations that-the FCC and GS found themselves experiencing were only
the latest manifestation. Their fragmentation was a product of their poor
understanding ofthe crisis, disagreements over strategy, and lack ofa cohesive

policy, all •of which stemmed from the groups' early charismatic-style
leadership. These' combined problems set up a situation that led to personalistic control, and subsequent infighting over power and policy direction.
: Personalism posed still another serious organizational problem for both

the FCC and GS. Personalism involves the arbitrary use of power by aleader
to gain support for control ofthe group, and it leads to loyalty to the leader

rather than to the group's goals. The failure to institutionalize a group's
power produces it. Personalism is common among newly forming activist
groups (Roberts and Kloss, 1979: 52-54). It often occurs during the rule ofa

charismatic leader or when there is no intellectual leader. The consequences
of this phenomenon can be seen in the failure ofits supporters to understand
the issues that brought them together and the sometimes resulting fragmenta
tion.
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The loyalty ofthe supporters to Wrage and Polzine was personalistic. In
these cases this created difficulties for moving toward realistic objectives to

resolve the problems of farmers, for Wrage and PoLone's ideas guided, but
also limited, the thought and action of their groups. Neither Wrage nor
Polzine were able to provide the necessary intellectual leadership. Personalism therefore led directly to the fragmentation of the FCC and the
creation of the Iowa Farm Crisis Network. GS also found itselfin a similar

situation invol\ing the personalistic leadership ofPolzine, which resulted in her
removal and the resignation of Larson.

Personalism, combined with theloss ofcharismatic leadership, led to the

disintegration of the FCC and reorganization of GS. Wrage declined to
continue as the president of his group in December 1986. The FCC was
dissolved within one month (Farm Crisis Committee, Annual Meeting, 1986).
Following a different path, GS moved toward institutionalization, under
administrative leaders, after theremoval ofPolzine. GS abandoned thetactic

of public protest, sought grants to fund its activities, firmed up its organiza
tional structure, and opened in March 1987 a headquarters in Wanda,
Minnesota (Groundswell Newsletter^ March 1987; Swoboda, 1987). In the

early years dfthe FCC and GS, personalism had severely weakened the ability
ofthese groups to achieve their objectives. Personalism actually brought an
end to the FCC, and only when GS moved toinstitutionalize its power did the
group achieve some degree of stability.

Beyond the organizational problems that the FCC and GS faced, they also
lacked a thorough understanding ofthe farm crisis. No intellectual leaders
emerged to create anew ideological understanding that could be used to guide
the groups. The leaders failure to comprehend fully the historical-structural
origins of the crisis prevented them from developing an effective strategy for
improving the situation of farmers. When queried about what they did to
inform themselves about the crisis, the leaders responded that they read

newspapers and magazines and watched telewsion (Polane, 1986; Wrage,

1986). These popular media sources of information concerning the crisis left
much to be desired for gaining an understanding of its causes, as they were
18
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produced by.the very interests that were producing the problems (Campbell,
1985; DeLind, 1985-86; Parenti, 1986). The crisis in fact was much more than
simply an immediate or temporary crisis, and actually was the product of
lengthy lustoricalpolitical-economic developments (Hamilton, 1986; Lewontin
and Berlan, 1986; Nugent, 1986; Waterfield, 1986). The failure of the FCC
and GS's leaders to understand this point led them to approach the crisis as

if it were a temporary phenomenon that could be reformed away through
appeals to state and federal legislative bodies. The strategies of the farm
leaders were much the same as those of previous generations of farm leaders,

and were wholly inadequate to deal with the deeplyrooted nature of the crisis.,
Because the farm leaders of the FCC and GS failed to understand the

nature of the problems that theywere confronting, their policies and strategies
proved inadequate. Both the FCC and GS adopted reformist approaches to
correct the situation in which they asked state and federal legislative bodies
for help. They adopted policies that asked for higher prices, lower loan rates,

and moratoriums on foreclosures' Requests for poliq' changes such as these
did not, and could not, bring the desired long-term results that they sought.
These were the same things farmers had been pleading for over the last one
hundred years, and they had over that period brought at best only temporary

relief from the continual displacement of farmers. The FCC an(J GS farm
leaders candidly admitted their failure to get workable reforms from the
government. Larson (1986) observed, "it's very frustrating when the state,
legislators say there is nothing they can do to help the farmer." And, Wrage
(1986) commented, "the elected officials do not care about the farmers."
Appeals to state and federal legislators for reform proved, as they had
historically, to be a futile strategy for the farm leaders.
The FCC and GS farm leaders' ability to recognize and deal with the
problems of organization and understanding was limited. There was little

indication that the leaders comprehended the problems let alone were able to

develop strategies to address them. This may explain why the new farm
groups experienced the same outcome as earlier farm groups. That outcome
was that farm groups were either tamed, like GS, through being co-opted by
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the established political structure, or slowly withered away, likethe FCC, due
to power struggles among leaders and supporters. The problems of the FCC
and GS were not insurmountable, but a failure to imderstand them resulted
in a continuation of the historical trend of the inability of farm groups to
survive and Hnd fitting solutions.

Conclusion

The social conditions that gave rise to the farm crisis in the Upper

Midwest during the mid-1980s also produced the farm leaders who founded
the FCC and GS. This can be seen in the personal characteristics of the
leaders. Theyweremiddle-aged farm men and women beingpushed offtheir

f^ms who had a history of actively participating as community leaders. The
economic and community crisis that the leaders confronted prodded these
already active persons to take leadership positions in the new farm groups.
Unfortunately, their personal histories made them unlikely leaders for a
social movement that could only succeed through mounting a profound
challenge to the structural arrangements ofAmerican society. Those who first
appeared to lead the groups were charismatic leaders, and critically needed
intellectual leaders failed to emerge. The farm leaders of the FCC and GS

were steeped in traditional norms, values, and beliefs that led them to seek
traditional reformist solutions. Their upbringing, education, and general

consciousness left them little prepared to deal with the profound historicalstructural problems that they faced.

This profile of the farm leaders of the FCC and GS, perhaps more than
anything else, points out how difficult change is to bring about without
effective leadership that has a full understanding of the problems that it
confronts. Whether or not the farm leaders who finally gained leadership,

with their administrative orientation, willfind the necessaryunderstanding to
regain control of their lives remains to be seen.
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